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People differ not only in their culture but also in their nature, or rather, in the 
way they construct relations between humans and non-humans.1 
Loss 
We hear a lot these days about loss. In April 2009, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) estimated that banks, insurance instruments and pension funds 
have ‘lost’ some US $4.1 trillion from the global economy.2 The amounts lost to 
taxpayers via government removal of the toxic assets littering the financial 
sector are so huge as to be almost meaningless. According to the IMF, UK 
taxpayers have already lost over £1.2 trillion to Britain’s financial sector,3 while 
in North America the Inspector General of the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) stated recently that potential government/taxpayer assistance could 
total $23.7 trillion.4 Meanwhile, the International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN) asserts that the wildlife crisis actually is worse than the 
economic crisis, with almost 900 species lost already in an analysis of some 
45,000, and no fewer than 16,928 of these currently threatened with extinction.5 
Habitat loss to ‘development’ is a major cause of these extinctions. Greenpeace 
reports of the Brazilian Amazon that ‘one acre [is] lost every 8 seconds’, the 
hamburger-cattle sector identified here as the major driver of clear-felling in this 
landscape.6  
Crisis Capitalism and the Creation of ‘Value’ 
Notwithstanding the complexities beneath these alarming figures, they do seem 
to signal some sort of crisis, both of capitalism, and of ‘the environment’. 
Intuitively it makes sense to think that these crises might be connected in two 
key ways. First, that economic exploitation and the profit motive, in driving 
production and transformed consumption of ‘natural resources’, is causing and 
contributing to ecological crisis. And second, that the ecological crisis arising 
from these pressures is itself generating crisis in the global economy, through 
making manifest the material limits to economic production and consumption. 
This is the so-called Limits to Growth argument of the 1970s,7 which posited 
resource limits to economic growth, and the need to sensibly distribute 
resources as well as reducing production and consumption to avert both 
economic and ecological crises.  
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But this intuitive view – that ecological loss is entwined with and also signals 
economic crisis – seems to be somewhat naïve. To look at these connections 
another way is to see that capitalism thrives on crisis. This is its engine of 
innovation and creativity. As with the Kafkaesque derivatives markets that in 
part have pushed the international finance market into such recent toxicity,8 
capitalism makes a virtue of crisis. If the risk of loss or hazard can be priced, 
and this financial value captured via trade and speculation, then economic 
growth – the unassailable good of capitalist ‘culture’ – will be maintained, to the 
presumed benefit of everyone.  
It also is in times of crisis that new forms of capitalist value, new frontiers of 
accumulation, and new enclosures and dispossessions, are created. In The Shock 
Doctrine, Naomi Klein forcefully argues that various crisis events, from natural 
disasters to terrorist attacks, in fact are central to the creation of the openings 
required for incursions of corporate capital investment, thinly masked by the 
seemingly liberating guise of instituting free markets and democracy.9 
In this zeitgeist of crisis capitalism, the environmental crisis itself has 
become a major new frontier of value creation and capitalist accumulation. 
Referred to by terms such as ‘market environmentalism’,10 ‘green 
neoliberalism’11 and ‘green capitalism’,12 the understanding is that if we just price 
the environment correctly – creating new markets for new ‘environmental 
products’ based on monetized measures of environmental health and 
degradation – then everyone and the environment will win. If nature can be 
rationally abstracted and priced into assets, goods and services, then 
environmental risk and degradation can be measured, exchanged, offset and 
generally minimized. At the same time, the new financial values accruing to the 
declining ‘stock’ of nature’s assets, goods and services might in and of 
themselves attract more financial value via speculative trade on stock exchanges. 
Indeed, stock exchanges focusing only on new environmental products now are 
arising, the Climate Exchanges in London and Chicago being key examples. 
These have been established for the sole purpose of brokering and trading the 
new commodity/currency of tradeable carbon – itself created as the vehicle via 
which climate-change-causing carbon emissions can be measured and ostensibly 
reduced.  
‘An Ecosystem at your Service?’13 
Behind this monetization of environmental crisis is a logic and language that 
transforms the global environment – Nature – into a provider of services for 
humans. This conceptual capture, and the economic rationalization of nature’s 
value that it permits, is facilitating the creation of markets for the exchange of 
‘ecosystem services’ in the form of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES).  
 Arguably this construction and discourse is justifying right now what in time 
might be considered a critical, cultural transformation in how relationships 
between humans and the non-human world are conceived, valued, managed and 
governed globally.  
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Conservation biologists have been labelling nature as service provider by 
using the language of ecosystem services since the 1970s.14 As noted above, this 
is a decade which also saw the first globalizing statements of concern regarding 
the ecological limits to economic growth and the emergence of environmentalist 
discourses requiring development to be ecologically, as well as economically, 
‘sustainable’.15 Some years later, Robert Costanza and colleagues brought the 
concept of ecosystem services firmly into economics by estimating their annual 
value globally to be $16-54 trillion.16 The ensuing alliance between 
environmental economists and environmental campaigners has emphasized 
‘convergence between commercial interest and environmental imperative’ in 
demonstrating ‘the business case for sustainable development’.17 At the same 
time, assertions of the monetized values for defined ecosystem services has led 
to the corresponding conclusion that currently they are not being valued for 
what they are worth, and that somehow they should be paid for. As Jean-
Christophe Vié, Deputy Head of IUCN’s Species Programme, stated recently:  
It’s time to recognize that nature is the largest company on Earth working for 
the benefit of 100 percent of humankind – and it’s doing it for free.18 
In recent years, two phenomena have conspired to push these concerns and 
concepts together to generate a utopian win-win scenario of both mitigating 
environmental degradation and facilitating economic growth through pricing the 
ecological services provided by nature. The first is the 2005 publication of the 
influential United Nations Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA), which 
highlights human-generated change of the biosphere and overwhelmingly uses 
the language of ecosystem services in speaking of the non-human world. These 
are further categorized into provisioning services (food, water, timber, fibre, 
etc.), regulating services (floods, droughts, land degradation and disease), 
supporting services (such as soil formation and nutrient cycling), and non-
material cultural services (recreational, spiritual, religious, etc.).19 Through 
combining the quantification skills of ecological science and economics, the 
MEA proposes that breaking nature down into these increasingly scarce 
services,20 quantifying their functionality, and assigning a price to them, will 
assist conservation by asserting their financial value; at the same time as 
fostering economic growth by creating new tradeable assets.21  
The second is the creation of a multi-billion dollar market in a new 
commodity – carbon – intended to mitigate (i.e. minimize) climate change by 
providing the possibility of profitably exchanging one of the gases contributing 
to anthropogenic global warming. As noted above, this is generating a market-
based context for approaching the broader environmental concerns of the 
MEA. Like Adam Smith’s putative economic ‘invisible hand’,22 the assumption 
is that both good environmental governance and the equitable distribution of 
environmental services will derive from the correct pricing of quantified 
environmental goods and services, combined with the self-regulating market 
behaviour that will emerge from their market exchange.  
In this case, the financial price attributed to carbon is allocated to, and 
therefore captured by, heavy industry emitters. It is they who gain tradeable 
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carbon credits (i.e. the currency representing carbon), for example, under the 
European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme.23 Some (currently minimal) 
scarcity is built into the market by allocating credits at a level below what major 
installations require to cover their emitting levels, so as to meet the emissions 
reducing targets set by the Kyoto Protocol of the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCC). Once these credits enter the international 
financial system their future value can be speculated on (as with any other 
currency or commodity, including derivatives) and significant profits can ensue. 
In the wake of this, a veritable ecosystem of economists, stockbrokers and 
financial advisers has emerged to service trade in this new commodity, as 
epitomized by the Europe Climate Exchange in the City of London. This is ‘the 
leading marketplace for trading carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in Europe and 
internationally’,24 and basically a stock exchange for the currency of tradeable 
carbon credits. Interestingly, the website of the Europe Climate Exchange 
provides very little information connecting this exchange with environmental 
impacts through the reduction of atmospheric CO2. Such presentation seems to 
emphasize that this is a product with a great deal to do with trade, finance and 
profit, that operates at a rather large remove from the materiality of global 
climate and eco-systems.  
The Ecosystem Marketplace 
Of course, payments for the environmental services produced by nature’s labour 
do not go to the environment itself, but to whoever is able to capture this newly 
priced value. A key logic is that such payments will act as compensation for 
economic opportunity costs in contexts where environmental-use practices are 
altered so as to conserve ecosystem services. As stated by Conservation 
International, ‘[t]he payment for ecosystem services concept helps address the 
destruction of Earth’s habitats, landscapes and ecosystems by assigning a value 
to these services, and compensating the people, communities and countries 
whose actions enhance or protect ecosystem services and the costs that work 
incurs’.25  
This might take the form of relatively simple direct payments for 
transformed behaviour to maintain a particular and clearly defined 
environmental good. In water management, for example, the water available to 
those living downstream can be directly negatively affected by water-users 
upstream, and PES schemes may be established to alter upstream behaviour so 
as to maintain downstream water quality and access. Paradigmatic here is the 
case of Vittel (Nestlé Water) in north-east France, who came to a financial 
agreement to compensate farmers for altering their nitrate-based fertilizing 
practices upstream which were contaminating the aquifer producing the bottled 
mineral water sold by the company.26 In this case the key parameters were 
relatively clear to define. They included the environmental good 
(uncontaminated water), the potential ‘servicers’ of that good (nitrate-using 
farmers), the environmental problem (contamination by nitrate-based 
fertilizers), and the purchaser of the environmental good (Vittel). Further critical 
factors are embodied here with implications for the applicability of such 
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initiatives elsewhere and over broader geographical scales, such as between 
contexts in the urban industrialized North and the rural ‘underdeveloped’ South. 
The wealth of the purchasing company and the continued market value of their 
product, provided economic sustenance for their interest in pursuing the 
ecosystem services exchange. The land constituting the source area for the water 
is enclosed as private property under clear tenure arrangements, permitting the 
establishment of relatively direct contracts between service purchasers and 
providers. And Vittel was able to collaborate with a professional and well-
funded prolonged (four-year) period of research on the connections between 
farming practices, water quality and potential collaborative alternatives, prior to 
the long-term establishment of a PES scheme. Even with these factors, the 
initiative cost Vittel some 24.25 million Euros to develop in its first seven years 
(an estimated 980 Euros per hectare per year),27 and it took some ten years 
following the initial four-year period of research for the scheme to become 
operational.  
Increasingly, PES involves the creation of derived environmental ‘products’ 
that are agreed by sellers and buyers to represent some sort of measure of 
environmental health or degradation. An example might be the creation of 
schemes financed as commercial deals by private investors whereby new 
products representing a defined environmental good are sold both to fund 
conservation practice and to generate a return to investors. The Malua Wildlife 
Habitat Conservation Bank (MWHCB), also referred to as the Malua BioBank, 
in Sabah, Malaysia,28 might be considered a paradigmatic example here. In this 
scheme a collaboration between private investors and the Sabah government 
has created saleable ‘Biodiversity Conservation Certificates’, each representing 
100m2 of rainforest restoration and protection. Over a 50-year license of 
conservation rights to the BioBank from the Sabah government,29 the sale of 
certificates is intended to ‘make rainforest rehabilitation and conservation a 
commercially competitive land use’.30 It is projected that the initial US$10 
million of private investment committed for the rehabilitation of the Malua 
Forest Reserve over an initial six years will be recovered from the sale of these 
certificates and also will endow a trust fund (the Malua Trust) to fund the long-
term conservation management of the BioBank over the remaining 44-year 
period of the license. In this case, investment is via the Eco Products Fund, LP, 
a private equity investment vehicle managed by the international asset brokers 
New Forests Inc.31 and Equator Environmental, LLC (whose self-defining 
phrase is ‘creating value by investing in ecosystems’32). As a member of the 
collaborative Clinton Global Initiative33 between governments, the private 
sector, NGOs and ‘other global leaders’, the Eco Products Fund commits US$1 
million over 6-10 years towards finding ways, globally, ‘[t]o realize value from 
illiquid environmental assets such as carbon, water, and biodiversity, and to use 
innovative financial structures to represent the value of these critical services in 
the marketplace’.34 In the case of the Malua BioBank, any profits from the sale 
of biodiversity certificates are to be shared between the forest management 
license holder and the investor. The purchase of certificates does not constitute 
an offset against rainforest impacts elsewhere, and as such is designed to 
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constitute a simple purchase of conservation. It is projected that by the end of 
the licensing period the initial endowment ‘will be fully capitalized and this 
funding can be used either to renew the conservation rights to the Malua Forest 
Reserve or to establish a conservation bank on another property with high 
biodiversity value’.35 Within-country ‘conservation banks’ and ‘species banks’, 
involving the creation and trading of ‘credits’ representing biodiversity values on 
private land, also are proliferating, particularly in the US.36 
While purchase of the Malua BioBank’s biodiversity certificates is not 
designed to offset environmentally damaging activities due to the 
transformation of landscapes through economic development elsewhere, much 
of the anticipation regarding the new pricing of ecosystem services revolves 
around exactly this. Thus the attribution of new prices to conserved land already 
owned by commercial companies might be mobilized so as to offset 
environmental degradation caused through resource extraction elsewhere. Even 
more attractively, companies might be able to trade newly priced marketable 
ecosystem services on appropriated land that they now own, thereby capturing 
new financial value from the new construction of nature as service provider. 
Mining conglomerate Rio Tinto, for example, are exploring with the IUCN 
‘opportunities to generate marketable ecosystem services on land owned or 
managed by the company’.37 These might include ‘potential biodiversity banks in 
Africa, as well as the opportunity to generate marketable carbon credits by 
restoring soils and natural vegetation or by preventing emissions from 
deforestation and degradation’.38 Environmental credits rewarded to businesses 
for ecosystem improvement activities also might be ‘banked’ against future 
environmental liabilities’ or sold to other land developers ‘to compensate for the 
adverse environmental impacts of their projects’,39 with a new generation of 
‘commercial conservation asset managers’ required to broker these exchanges 
and revenues.  
These new forms of ecosystem value thus become conventional business 
opportunities for investment: the ensuing transformation of ecosystem services 
into marketable assets provides ‘new trading opportunities’ such that buyers and 
sellers of these services can generate profit that ‘does not imply the loss of 
natural assets’.40 Large corporations, investors and investment brokers now are 
moving to claim slices of emerging ecosystem markets, and the potential finance 
flows accruing from newly priced species, ecosystems, services and 
environmental products.  
The new global multi-billion dollar trade in carbon, in particular, is providing 
a market-based model, embraced by both business and major environmental 
organizations, for pricing and exchanging environmental products across the 
environmental spectrum under the rapidly proliferating arenas of PES and the 
proposed programme administered by the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD). A critical component of the logic underlying these 
approaches is an assumption that environments, emissions and effects in very 
different locations somehow are equivalent and therefore substitutable, such 
Upsetting the Offset 
  261 
that they allow negative impacts in one location to be offset against 
environmental investments in another. So the REDD programme proposes 
equivalence between carbon emitted in the fossil-fuel fumes of cars and industry 
etc., with that stored in living and decomposing biomass in the myriad 
configurations of long-evolved and diverse assemblages of species. Emissions 
therefore can be offset against newly priced carbon stored in standing forests, 
principally in ‘developing countries’. An accompanying logic is that the new 
financial value accruing to standing forests will act to reduce the carbon 
emissions produced by their potential transformation into different landscapes 
which currently might be more economically profitable (to some people at 
least); examples might include the clear-felling of the Amazon for hamburger-
cattle, soya or oil production.  
But significant questions remain. Are the molecules of CO2 emitted through 
fossil-fuel burning really equivalent to the carbon stored in complex terrestrial 
ecosystems whose assemblages have evolved over many millennia? Do such 
offsetting schemes actually reduce environmental impacts (e.g. levels of CO2 
emissions), or do they instead provide incentives to continue to profit from 
these emissions and their trade? And as discussed below, how does trade in 
derived environmental products relate to and affect the peoples, livelihoods and 
lifeworlds located in the landscapes from which these products are derived?  
Nevertheless, new markets for ecosystem services and other ecological 
products now are proliferating, with an accompanying array of brokers 
advertising ecological wares online. Websites and companies abound with 
names such as ‘Ecosystem Marketplace’,41 ‘Species Banking’42 and ‘Climate 
Change Capital’.43 At the same time, the major global conservation NGOs such 
as Conservation International (CI), The Nature Conservancy, and the World 
Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) are embracing PES as a critical tool for 
generating and distributing the finance needed for conservation activities. A CI 
glossy brochure called Nature Provides, published in August 2009, thus announces 
the forthcoming launch of ARIES – Artificial Intelligence for Ecosystem 
Services – described as a ‘web-based technology...offered to users worldwide to 
assist rapid ecosystem service assessment and valuation at multiple scales, from 
regional to global’.44 This alliance between investment capital, business and 
environmental organizations is being fostered by the world’s oldest and largest 
global environmental organization – the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) – a network of governments, donor agencies, 
foundations, member organizations and corporations (www.iucn.org). An 
onlooker at the four-yearly IUCN World Conservation Congress in Barcelona in 
October 2008, for example, would be forgiven for thinking that multinational 
corporations now are the planet’s conservationists. At this event, the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) was particularly 
visible. This is a network of the Chief Executive Officers of some 200 
corporations, whose mission statement is ‘to provide business leadership as a 
catalyst for change toward sustainable development, and to support the business 
license to operate, innovate and grow in a world increasingly shaped by 
sustainable development issues’.45 The image in Figure 1, taken at the prominent 
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WBCSD stand at the 2008 World Conservation Congress, is suggestive of its 
planetary reach and ambition. It depicts the brand logos of many of the world’s 
largest multinationals, stretching across an abstract earth, smoothed of 
difference, diversity and inequality. This is a world good for capital. But is it also 
good for cultural and ecological diversity? 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The world according to the World Business Council for Sustainable Development: a 
smooth earth populated by corporate logos. From the WBCSD display at the 2008 World 
Conservation Congress of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature. Photo: Sian 
Sullivan. 
A Unifying Language?  
Recently, the UNEP and the IUCN described ecosystem services as a ‘unifying 
language’ in global environmental policy.46 This indeed may be the desire. 
Significant questions remain, however, with serious relevance for the 
distribution of power and voice in global decision-making. Who is creating and 
writing this language and for whom? What are the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions built into the construction of nature as service 
provider – i.e. what is understood to be the nature of nature? And what are 
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thereby legitimated as appropriate methods for claiming ‘nature knowledge’? 
How are human/non-human relationships being structured, both materially and 
conceptually, in the process of creating and instituting this ‘unifying language’? 
And what knowledges and experiences are being othered and displaced through 
the parlance and practice of ecosystem services markets?  
Some of these questions can be approached through the brief descriptions of 
PES concepts and schemes outlined above. The construction and monetization 
of nature as service provider clearly produces a range of significant 
transformations. Through PES the non-human world in all its diversity and 
mystery becomes the provider of services for humans. People dwelling in areas 
now valued for the ecosystem services they provide to people in other locations 
become the necessary custodians and providers of these services, with 
recompense from service-users being dependent on services received. This may 
be a double-edged sword for people living in newly priced service-providing 
landscapes, especially in the Global South. Continuing a long history of 
displacement for environmental conservation,47 food-producing practices and 
cultures may be restructured and constrained in the process of shifting from 
direct production for subsistence and livelihoods to producing environmental 
service-oriented landscapes. And finally, those numerate in the labyrinthine 
abstractions accompanying the creation of new ecological commodities and 
markets – accountants, brokers, bankers and assisting ecological scientists – 
become the expert mediators and managers of monetary value for both.  
All these transformations emphasize conceptual difference rather than 
continuity between human and non-human worlds. Nature somehow is 
backdrop to, rather than co-creator of, human activity. At the same time they 
reinforce somewhat Hegelian master-servant relationships between human and 
non-human realms, extended further to those between ‘experts’ on, and 
inhabitants of, newly priced service-providing landscapes.48 Nature serves 
culture; and those dwelling in landscapes newly monetized for their provision of 
ecosystem services are themselves constructed as servers for visions of the 
appropriate nature of these landscapes, as perceived by policy and technical 
experts who, while globally mobile, frequently are based in distant urban 
locations.  
These transformations are critical for cultures as well as for environments 
worldwide. I opened this chapter by noting the ways in which economic and 
ecological crisis narratives revolve around assertions of loss. To complete the 
picture, the 2009 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) Atlas of the World’s Languages in Danger announces 
the loss of 233 known languages, with a further 574 classified as ‘critically 
endangered’.49 If language is a key lexicon through which culture is expressed, 
shared and made meaningful, then the loss of languages equates with the demise 
of cultures. The causes are complex interactions of marginalization, 
‘acculturation’ to modern monetary and capitalist culture, and direct 
displacement. The outcome is a subtle ‘culturecide’: the death of collective 
identities through displacement by a dominant and globalizing culture that has 
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amongst its norms and values certain disciplining assumptions about the nature 
of reality. These include rather strict conceptual separations between culture and 
nature (echoed by that between mind and body, male and female, civilized and 
wild and so on) – separations which tend to privilege the first part of each of 
these binaries; together with the elevation of monetized exchange as the key 
measure and mediator of value. As indicated by the global loss of languages, the 
peoples, cultures and epistemologies that are othered in this capitalist 
structuring of values can become rather ‘disposable’,50 in part through 
constructing them as poor, marginal, and often as environmentally problematic.  
As an extension of a globalizing capitalist culture which has these 
assumptions at its heart, it is difficult not to see the unifying language of 
ecosystem services as part and parcel of these processes of cultural displacement 
in the realm of human/non-human relationships, understandings and values. In 
part this is because the proliferating freedoms and futures espoused by free-
market environmentalism simultaneously close off possibilities for other 
freedoms and futures in how relationships between human and non-human 
worlds are practiced and expressed. Many forms of value, appreciation, 
understanding and experience of non-human worlds simply are 
incommensurable with economic pricing mechanisms, and are displaced or 
closed off completely in the process of pricing for monetized exchange.51 Where 
money and capital are the measures of wealth, economically marginalized 
indigenous cultures, as well as those who choose to live by different values 
within highly industrialized nations,52 are seen only as materially poor and thus 
requiring intervention to foster economic development. A recent UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization report thus focuses on the desire to better capture the 
ecosystem services provided by dryland ecosystems globally, in part through 
shifting the livestock-based livelihoods of ‘the poor’ who dwell in such lands.53 
As I have noted elsewhere,54 the ‘poor’ in these contexts include peoples as 
diverse as Maasai of East Africa, Raika pastoralists of India’s Rajasthan, and 
Quechua-speaking highland herders in Peru: a global fabric of rich and different 
cultures sustained through mixed farming practices of which livestock constitute 
a major part. Importantly, such peoples may not define themselves and their 
land-entwined lifeworlds as ‘poor’, as indicated by Maasai in the strong 
statement that ‘the poor are not us’.55  
A particular irony here is that many of the endangered languages noted 
above are those of so-called indigenous cultures; of people who retain and can 
trace some form of coherent connection with the landscapes with which their 
lineages are entwined. Often these connections seem to be in landscapes that 
currently are highly valued for their biodiversity and other environmental riches. 
At risk of essentializing or romanticizing, perhaps it might be that the 
complexities of indigenous cultural engagement with these landscapes have 
something to do with their current conservation value. It might also signal that 
disappearing languages and their associated cultures have something relevant to 
say and teach about other possibilities for what it means to be and become 
human today, in dynamic relationship with non-human worlds.  
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Cultured Lands 
Despite a problematic past in service to colonial endeavours, anthropology has 
relevance here as an academic discipline that at least makes some effort to 
understand and enter into culturally unfamiliar experiences and conceptions of 
being human. With Damara or $N" Khoen people living in the dry, open lands 
of north-west Namibia, I have been privileged to witness, experience and learn 
some very different ways of relating with the non-human world. Here, for 
example, the process of acquiring food and other substances, while a pragmatic 
effort to procure resources, at the same time also required constant 
conversation and exchange with the ancestors and other non-human presences 
populating the land. Non-human worlds were alive to be spoken to, and 
variously remonstrated with and celebrated through words, song, dance and gift-
giving. People were not separate and alienated from the non-human world; they 
were co-creators with it.  
To illustrate this, let me relate one story here.56 Figure 2 is an image taken in 
1995 at a place called |Giribes, which are large open grassy plains to the north-
west of a larger settlement called Sesfontein or! Nani|aus. We had driven there 
early in the morning, and the sun was starting to burn. I had my notebook and 
plant press at the ready, and was keen to get going with the resource-use 
documentation – the knowledge collection, if you like – that I hoped to do that 
day. But the first thing that these three people did – they are Nathan $Ûina 
Taurob on the right, his daughter and her partner – was to move some way 
away from the car, sit down and start talking out at the land. I remember feeling 
slightly bemused and impatient at the time, anxious to get on with the ‘real 
work’ of resource collection and documentation. But I was curious enough to 
ask what they were doing.  
The answer I received was that this was aoxu – the practice of connecting 
with and giving something away to their ancestors remaining in this landscape 
and to the spirits of the land, to ask for safe passage and for success in finding 
the foods they wished to gather. They were giving away tobacco – $N" Khoen, 
particularly of Sesfontein/!Nani|aus, have long been known regionally for the 
pungent tobacco they grow in small gardens – and also the leaves of tsaurahais or 
Colophospermum mopane, valued locally for their healing properties. The direction 
they are facing is to the north – towards the settlement of Purros. This is the 
land where Nathan $Ûina grew-up; it is the land (!h!s) that he knew and loved, 
and with which his heart as a healer (!gaiaob) was connected. Nathan and his 
family were no longer able to live there, but in the 1990s they continued to 
return to these areas, sometimes for several weeks at a time. Most of this 
movement was completely invisible to the various formal administrations of the 
region. And some of it meant moving into tourism concessions, run by 
commercial enterprises, to which they officially no longer had access. 
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Figure 2: Nathan $Ûina Taurob and family greet and gift the spirits of the land in |Giribes plains, 
north-west Namibia. Photo: Sian Sullivan. 
 
It took a fairly prolonged period of unlearning of my own encultured 
assumptions regarding the nature of reality to reach some understanding of 
what might be going on here. From this and other experiences, I know now that 
it is possible for human beings to embody an implicit ethos of reciprocity in 
relationship with the other sentient beings making up what we now call 
biodiversity. In this way of doing things, all ‘resource-use practice’ 
simultaneously is a conversation, a negotiation and an exchange that binds 
people into multilayered and multifaceted direct reciprocal arrangements with 
ancestors, spirit and with other species. It is not just about something that is 
taken to be consumed; it also is about something that is returned, through direct 
material and energetic exchanges with the non-human world. Human beings can 
thereby communicate with and serve the known and unpredictable 
manifestations of the non-human world, and in doing so affirm reciprocal moral 
obligations as well as make moral sense of phenomena that cannot be 
completely knowable or ultimately controlled. Infusing this is an epistemic and 
ontological orientation to non-human worlds that embraces continuity with, 
rather than separateness between, these realms, and that encourages movements 
with, rather than ownership and management over, dynamic ecosystem 
processes. I perceive also that this practice and logic is encountered in remaining 
shamanic cultures worldwide – cultures that interestingly also seem to be those 
who have lived in maintaining relationships with currently much sought after 
biodiversity. There is depth, diversity and coherence in the understandings of, 
and communications with, an animated non-human world embodied by many 
of the world’s now disappearing cultures.57 But these are ways that seem opaque 
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to a modern world whose cosmovision rests instead on fetishized commodities, 
financial transactions, private property, competition and hunger for growth.  
International PES policy developments such as REDD assert the need for 
‘ensuring effective participation’ of indigenous peoples and local communities,58 
and many such communities may see participation in these schemes as a means 
of generating income and gaining footholds in global economic structures. 
Others, however, express resistance to ‘being participated’ on the programmatic 
terms laid out by these schemes. A recent declaration of Confederation of 
Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONFENIAE) thus 
states that:  
We reject the negotiations on our forests, such as REDD projects, because they 
try to take away our freedom to manage our resources and also because they are 
not a real solution to the climate change problem, on the contrary, they only 
make it worse.59 
Such resistance denotes a missed opportunity. This is not in terms of local 
peoples coming on board in these narrowing trajectories for determining value 
for the global environment. It is in terms of missed opportunities for listening 
to and learning from different ways of conceptualizing and enacting 
relationships with the non-human world.  
Serving Nature?  
Green capitalism and market environmentalism are rapidly becoming the 
dominant policy and political choices linking environmental health with 
economic development. In this paradigm the creation and capture of market 
value for the services provided for humans by the non-human world is 
considered the most efficient and sustainable means of mitigating global 
environmental problems while maintaining and even enhancing economic 
growth. In this article I ask some questions of this significant conceptual 
reframing of nature as service provider. What might this discourse say of the 
ways in which our collective relationship with the non-human world is 
construed and constructed? What is othered and excluded in the process, and 
what significance does this have for understanding both the phenomenon of 
nature and for the cultural and epistemological inclusiveness of contemporary 
environmental agendas? And finally, what potential does the understanding of 
nature as service provider really have for kindling health in the earth’s 
psychosocial- and eco-systems? 
Gretchen Daily and colleagues represent a common optimism in claiming 
that ‘[t]he main aim in understanding and valuing natural capital and ecosystem 
services is to make better decisions, resulting in better actions relating to the use 
of land, water, and other elements of natural capital’.60 Such a statement, 
however, is devoid of political and epistemological context. It affects an illusion 
of solution through ecological modernization61 and linear progress.62 At the 
same time, and in common with most international environment and 
development initiatives, it uses a depoliticized language that excises the 
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significance of ‘for who’ and ‘by whom’ questions in this new governance 
arena.63 
The core idea underlying these initiatives is that so-called environmental 
services have not been correctly valued to date. Of course I would agree that 
capitalist culture has tended to ride roughshod over both biological and cultural 
diversity. But it seems to me that pricing something financially is not the same 
thing as valuing it. 
We are critically impoverished as human beings if the best we can come up 
with is money as the mediator of our relationships with the non-human world. 
Allocating financial value to the environment does not mean that we will 
embody practices of appreciation, attention, or even of love in our 
interrelationships with a sentient, moral and agential64 non-human world. 
Instead, it lowers ‘the moral tone of social life’ and, through doing so, it furthers 
damage to both humans and ecosphere because ‘the pricing of everything works 
powerfully as a device for making morality and love... seem irrelevant’.65 
We are bearing witness to another significant and accelerating wave of 
enclosure and primitive accumulation to liberate natural capital for the global 
market. Commodification now extends from genes to species and to 
ecosystems, i.e. to all the domains of diversity that are delineated by the 
Convention on Biodiversity (www.cbd.int). The continued capture and 
monetized exchange of the non-human world in the form of Payments for 
Ecosystem Services (PES) seems set to have an impact on global human/non-
human relationships as significant as that which began with the transformation 
of land into individualized property in England from the Tudors onwards: 
formalized throughout Europe through escalating Enclosure Acts and 
accompanying property law, and exported globally via European colonial 
adventure.66 We know from history that this past revolution in capital creation, 
accumulation and investment had major social and environmental implications, 
reducing diverse cultures to labour in the service of capital, and disembedding 
peoples’ relationships with landscapes in the process.67  
It seems clear that collectively we are in need of some radically different 
ways of valuing the global environment. But is it possible to turn instead for 
training and inspiration to those who, in many different contexts, and often 
against the odds, seem to have both valued and served nature’s ‘services’? And 
through doing so is it possible to (re)claim and (re)learn communicative 
relationships with non-human worlds: worlds which express the same moral, 
creative, mysterious and playful agencies that humans also embody? Perhaps it 
might be that ways of relating with and valuing non-human worlds that are 
othered by modernity and capitalist culture, in fact are those offering openings 
into possibilities for dwelling that are less hungry and more sustainable, at the 
same time as perhaps being more meaningful, poetic and enjoyable. But to hear 
and learn this requires an act that capitalist and developmentalist culture almost 
by definition cannot countenance: which is stopping to listen to, and perhaps 
even embodying, such alternatives. 
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